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Pride and Prejudice 
in South Korea's Foreign Policy 
Abstract 
On the last frontier of the Cold War, nothing is what it seems any more. 
On the surface, the old alliances still hold, but underneath a new order is 
gradually taking shape. This article analyses the various historical processes 
that have contributed to Seoul's redefinition of its international role. As the 
international political and economic context changed following the end of 
the Cold War in Europe, new challenges and opportunities also appeared 
on the horizon on the Korean peninsula. These were met by a revitalized 
Korean nation, where a tainted elite was gradually driven from political 
and economic power. Proud of its democratic institutions and content with 
its economic success, Seoul engages the world with dignity, looking to- 
wards the future with confidence, but sensitive over historical legacies. 
Of Shrimp and Whale: Reality and Its Perception 
One look at a map suffices to understand the Korean predicament. The 
Korean peninsula is hardly more than an appendix of the vast Asian 
continent. This geographical reality has had its obvious consequences 
on the history of Korea. Small in comparison to its three bigger neigh- 
bours, China, Russia and Japan, Korea's room for political manoeuvre 
has always been circumscribed by the intentions of the regional powers. 
At times, skilful diplomacy could hold them at bay, but on other occa- 
sions, Korea fell victim to the grand schemes of territorial aggrandise- 
ment of either China or Japan. When by the end of the 19th century 
modern imperialism washed up on its shores, Korea was ill-prepared 
to face that challenge. After several hundred years of seclusion from 
the world, and domestically in crisis, the Korean court failed to respond 
adequate1y.l Korea's self-imposed international isolation disintegrated 
under the forceful pressure of Japan. In the wake of the 1876 unequal 
Kanghwado Treaty with Japan, Korea successively entered into treaty 
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relations with the US, Britain, Germany, France, Russia and China. Ko- 
rea's political leaders sought to maintain national sovereignty by playing 
off one neighbour against the other. Any skilful diplomacy was offset 
by the ongoing domestic political crisis. During the nearly three decades 
between the opening of the country and colonization by Japan, Korea 
stumbled from one reform government to another. Political in-fighting, 
but above all successive political purges, left the country by the end of 
the 19th century in need of visionary politicians who could both win and 
keep the heart of King, later Emperor, Kojong. Unable to steer a steady 
reform policy, the court and the country were left adrift. The resulting 
power vacuum on the peninsula created an international struggle for 
supremacy over Korea (Kim Key-Hiuk 1980; Deuchler 1977). 
A traditional Korean saying has it that when whales battle, shrimps 
get hurt. When Japan went on the warpath over Korea, Koreans felt 
like the proverbial shrimp. Korea was the war bounty that Japan fought 
over with China (the first Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95), and with Rus- 
sia (the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05). Alongside these two military 
campaigns, the Japanese government sought diplomatic acquiescence 
from Great Britain (the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905) and the US (the 
Taft-Katsura Agreement, 1905) for its control over Korea (Kim and Kim 
1967; Duus 1995). Internationally uncontested, Korea had to endure 35 
long and harsh years of Japanese colonization. No matter the suffering, 
Koreans failed to come up with a credible challenge to colonial rule. 
Liberation came as a gift, granted by the Allies when Japan capitulated 
on 15 August 1945. 
Despite attempts to take over control of the country, Koreans were 
denied full independence at the time of the Japanese capitulation. The 
allied powers did not think the Korean people capable of managing an 
independent state. Their suggestion was to put Korea under interna- 
tional trusteeship for an indeterminate period of time, until they consid- 
ered Koreans fit to govern themselves. Eventually, nothing of the sort 
happened. Korean demands for immediate independence and growing 
disenchantment between the two occupying powers (the USSR in the 
North, the US in the South) led to the organization of free, UN-super- 
vised elections in the South, and the establishment of an independent 
Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948. The North followed suit with the 
establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 Sep- 
tember 1948 (Cumings 1981 & 1990). Neither state accepted the division, 
instead claiming legitimacy over the other half. Political posturing and 
military bravado eventually spilled over into outright war. 
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Reminiscent of late 19th-century politics, both Korean states aptly used 
their international relations during the Korean War (1950-53) to further 
their domestic goals. The internationalization of what in essence was a 
domestic conflict led to a stalemate that endures through the armistice 
agreement until today.2 The Korean War merely confirmed the status 
quo ante. The Cold War regime strengthened their international alliances 
and allowed ideological intransigence. What resulted was a situation 
where both states leaned back in blissful ignorance of each other. Their 
positions only shifted when the security alliances of both states suffered 
from some strains. At such times, a strange diplomatic ballet of inter- 
Korean rapprochement started. With both sides highly self-conscious, 
one could hardly speak of dialogue. Inter-Korean encounters were 
not meant to seek an improvement of relations, nor to find solutions 
to pending issues, but to prove one right, and to gain the upper hand 
over the other. Progress was almost non-existent, and whatever slight 
progress was made failed to reach fruition (Gills 1996). 
Europe may have been the continent where the Cold War ended, 
but its effects were felt globally. Along with the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the containment-based stability of the post-Second World War order 
crumbled. Along with new opportunities, new threats appeared on 
the horizon. East Asia seemed largely unaffected by this groundswell 
of change. On the Korea peninsula, the last frontier of the Cold War 
formally still holds and long-standing security alliances still guarantee 
the status quo. Seen from a distance, it looks as if this lingering Cold 
War sore continues to fester, and nothing has changed in the decades- 
long North-South stand-off. Visitors to the truce village, Panmunjom, 
come away with a vivid sense of the military tension that still reigns 
along the demilitarized zone. Despite the continuing military stand-off, 
major changes have occurred over the last 15 years on both diplomatic 
and political levels both in North and South Korea and in the region, 
changes that have not been sufficiently highlighted by the international 
media. This is in part due to the fact that media are event-driven, not to 
say crisis-driven. They are less able to pick up and decipher a gradual 
but incremental process of change. 
The trade of global press agencies leads to short-sightedness; only the 
obvious, eye-catching event raises eyebrows and becomes newsworthy. 
The steady dynamic of change is often too subtle to be marketable, not 
tangible enough to be easily presentable to today's consumer, who is 
considered to have a short attention span. Another factor that leads to 
short-sightedness is the self-centredness of the media and their home 
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market. Only news that directly impacts on the home constituency is 
deemed to be worth reporting. Foreign news tends to focus on bilateral 
relations and overlooks the multilateral intra-regional relations that have 
been evolving over the years. Since the anchor or editor speaks for the 
paradigmatic consumer, it is the latter's vantage point that is adopted. 
Asia gets hidden in a myopic blur where distance clouds distinction. 
The anecdotal tends to prevail. But anecdotes only thrive when exist- 
ing images are confirmed over and over again. Hence news is filtered, 
highlighting those parts that validate the cliche, corroborating and 
strengthening what can only be described as an 'orientalist' gaze of an 
'immutable East'. Complexity falls victim to easily digestible pieces. 
Even in the rare instance when local experts are asked to contribute, 
their input more often than not validates the prevalent image and 
viewpoint, leaving out or giving less prominence to any deviant views 
or reports. News thus tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Sigal 
1998: 207-28). 
Commentators and political scientists seem trapped in the same 
mindset. Holding on to a threat-driven, security-based discourse, they 
tend to focus on bilateral relations, very often the relations of a spe- 
cific country with the United States, and fail to capture the regional, 
multilateral framework of cooperation and consultation that has been 
taking shape over the last  decade^.^ Obsessed with the Cold War, and 
constantly reminded of it by each new crisis that erupts, they have failed 
to notice that these crises are nothing but the remnants of a Cold War 
regime. Underneath the convulsions of a bygone age, a new structure 
has gradually been taking shape. In the end, the Cold War lives on as 
a mental state more than anything else, a paradigm applied to interna- 
tional relations to make the world comprehensible. 
This paradigm also ruled the minds of South Korean politicians."f 
the Cold War is coming to an end on the Korean peninsula, then this is 
not only because the international situation has changed, but also be- 
cause a new generation of politicians is at the helm in Seoul. A regained 
awareness of agency is what makes all the difference. The unquestioned 
deference towards the US has been replaced by a strong sense of national 
dignity. The belief that the international interests of the US overlapped 
with South Korea's national interests has been replaced by the conviction 
that identical goals may hide different purposes and methods. Rather 
than to let the US speak for ROK interests, South Korean politicians now 
speak up in their own name for the interests of the whole of Korea.; 
The shrimp is wagging its tail. 
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Regional Dynamics, Nationalism 
and National Self-Assertion 
In the East Asian region, the end of the Cold War and the relaxation of 
ideological confrontation in international relations have led to a shift 
in the balance of power. Rather than continuing to hide behind any 
of the major powers, the East Asian nations stepped up their mutual 
dialogue and forged ahead with the construction of a new regional 
power equilibrium, all the while maintaining their traditional alliances 
(Yi 2005). In the case of the Korean peninsula, new partnerships based 
on mutual economic and strategic benefits emerged, gradually over- 
ruling the ideology-based alliances dating back to the Korean War. 
South Korea benefited most from this de-ideologization. Its economic 
prowess charmed both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China into establishing diplomatic relations with their erstwhile foe. 
The pragmatic foreign policy of President Roh Tae Woo lured Russia 
and China away from the rigidly dogmatic and confrontational foreign 
policies of North Korea. Nor did the North's rapid economic decline 
improve its international appeal. 
On closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that not only did Seoul cash 
in on the opportunities offered by the end of the Cold War, but there 
was also a domestic push factor at work. The way Seoul reacted to the 
changing international environment can only be understood by taking 
into account the momentous changes occurring at the same time within 
South Korean society. Rapid economic development, a peaceful democ- 
ratization and a generational shift in political personnel all contributed 
to a marked change in the self-perception of South Koreans. The new 
generation at the helm seemed unburdened by the past, exuding a radi- 
ant self-confidence. As a representative and a spokesperson of this na- 
tional self-confidence, the South Korean government is positioning itself 
internationally with greater self-assertion than ever before. At the same 
time, a vibrant civil society helped by a much freer press has made the 
government more accountable than at any time in the past (Shin 2004). 
Although the affirmation of national self-assertion should be con- 
sidered an aspect of an evolving Korean nationalism, I prefer to avoid 
this term. The lack of agreement on a common definition of national- 
ism on the one hand, and the frequent flippant usage of the term on 
the other, make this a black-box concept. Used randomly in an often 
undefined common-sense meaning, speakers and listeners alike project 
their respective cognitive and emotive biases, blurring the clarity of the 
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argument. Furthermore, in a multi-disciplinary context, scholars from 
different disciplines bring different traditions and assumptions to the 
study of nationalism. Historians and political scientists talk differently 
about nationalism. Functional communication on such a vague and 
ill-defined concept as nationalism thus becomes quite hazardous. Us- 
ing the less common term 'national self-assertion' avoids some of these 
pitfalls. The uncommonness of the term not only begs definition, one 
might also hope the reader will be more open to the specific meaning 
the author implies. 
Admittedly, I come to 'national self-assertion' in an attempt to describe 
a political dynamic at work in South Korean society. In the social sci- 
ences, individual self-assertion presupposes the notion of individual 
agency within a context where the individual rights of a citizen are re- 
cognized and institutionally protected. This, in turn, implicitly suggests 
that the social conditions of a market economy and a liberal democracy 
prevail. Given these assumptions and conditions, self-assertion refers to 
the conscious and active engagement of an individual in a process of 
making claims and/or entitlements when these are not transparently or 
clearly defined in the organization or the system to which this individual 
belongs. Applying this notion to a collective level, 'national self-asser- 
tion' builds on the notion of a modern nation-state and the existence of 
a collective 'national' consciousness as it is expressed through strategic 
engagements in international affairs by the nation's representative 
government or by less official entities as NGOs in an attempt to affirm 
specific national claims and/or  entitlement^.^ 
National self-assertion, as I use it in this article, refers to a specific 
phase of a specific form of Korean nationalism. The historical develop- 
ment of Korean nationalism is a field of study in its own right. Korean 
nationalism has a long, but hardly uniform history. Competing forms 
of nationalism have confronted each other in pitched ideological bat- 
tles, first over the course of Korea's struggle for national sovereignty, 
and later between and within rival Korean states. Not only did both 
Korean states use nationalism to further their popularity in the South, 
but the authoritarian state also confronted a popular nationalism that 
challenged its nationalist credentials. 
South Korean state nationalism was internationally always quite 
subdued and rather defensive, as if Korea were a proud but frightened 
nation. The national self-assertion I discern in South Korea's current 
foreign policy is the international face of a new stage in the develop- 
ment of the Korean nation.'Neither defensive, nor offensive, it is the 
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expression of a democratic government that seeks to further the national 
interests of the Korean nation while recognizing the legitimate interests 
of other states. It is not the expression of a confrontational nationalism, 
but the illustration of a newly discovered pride and self-confidence in 
the viability of the Korean nation in an international environment of 
peaceful CO-existence and co-operation with its neighbours. 
Tracking National Self-Assertion 
National self-assertion is the culmination of a long historical process of 
nation formation. In hindsight, the Korean nation awoke to the beat of 
modern nationalism at the end of the 19th century, but was caught in the 
stranglehold of Japanese colonization. It was torn apart by ideological 
divisions at the time of the liberation, and following the Korean War 
frozen into political sclerosis by Cold War intransigence. 
With political culture stifled under authoritarianism, South Korean 
society eventually regained power over its own history through the 
(gradual) democratization of the state structures. The South Korean 
authoritarian state had attempted all along to impose its form of state 
nationalism, but continuously found its nationalist credentials contested. 
In any case, the democratization of the South Korean state lessened the 
importance of nationalist mobilization in support of the state. Democrati- 
cally sanctioned, state legitimacy was found in popular representation, 
just as popular allegiance shifted to democratic institutions. In the course 
of the same democratization, the core component of the Korean nation, as 
it was implicitly understood, shifted from the political entity of the South 
Korean state towards a more cultural definition of an inclusive, people- 
based Korean national realm. With democracy secure in the South, the 
state no longer behaves in a frightened, wronged and vindictive way, but 
upholds an image of a confident, proud and magnanimous nation that 
reaches out to the world. Thus the democratization of Korean politics 
has led to a shift in the international position of South Korea. Driven 
by a strong sense of national identity and pride, the democratically 
elected government of the South Korean state, carried by a groundswell 
of popular support, advocates the interests of the Korean nation in an 
international context in a non-confrontational way. 
Just as the Cold War was born out of Second World War, so too was the 
division and the foundation of two separate and ideologically opposed 
states on the Korean peninsula a consequence of the post-Second World 
War international balance of power. The division grew out of much more 
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than just a security concern; it essentially shaped the political reality in 
the South. Political and economic development cannot be fully under- 
stood without acknowledging the depth of the division. Intellectually, 
the two states have quite distinct historical lineages rooted in different 
branches of the nationalist movement confronting Japanese coloniza- 
tion. This in turn relates to the development of modern nationalism in 
Korea from the end of the 19th century onwards. 
National Self-Deprecation and International Patronage 
Modern Korean nationalism developed in tandem with the historical 
denouement of Korean sovereignty. The concepts of modern national- 
ism had reached Asia along with western imperialism. Korean reform- 
minded intellectuals acknowledged the imperialist notion that coloniza- 
tion was the result of the inherent weakness of the Korean nation. They 
opted for a wholesale surrender to western liberal ideas, an openness to 
the world, and recognition of world capitalism. Another more populist 
tradition was explicitly seclusionist in attitude, and adopted a direct 
and violent method. To these radical nationalists, Korean independence 
was an absolute and unconditional good. Confronted with the military 
might of Japan, however, they stood no chance. During Korea's 35 years 
of colonial rule, the nationalist movement further splintered into various 
factions, covering the whole panoply from left to right, from moderate to 
radical, both in Korea proper and in exile. Except for some futile attempts, 
no unity was ever reached. Instead, ideological confrontation among the 
various nationalist factions sapped the strength of the resistance move- 
ment, and weakened the credibility of the resistance among the Allies. 
Following Japanese capitulation in 1945, fierce political battles were 
fought, eventually bringing to power Syngman Rhee in the South, and 
Kim I1 Sung in the North. Although both leaders, and the states they 
founded, claim ancestry in the national resistance movement, Syngman 
Rhee belongs to the moderate nationalist lineage, whereas Kim I1 Sung's 
nationalist pedigree is much more radical. Crowned with the aura of 
'Father of the Nation', Syngman Rhee's nationalism was what Ken Wells 
(1990) has termed 'Christian self-reconstruction nationalism'. Intellectu- 
ally, Syngman Rhee belonged to a generation of nationalists in East Asia 
who at the end of the 19th century interpreted international relations 
as a social Darwinist struggle for life among nations. He shared the 
conviction that the loss of independence was ultimately a consequence 
of the weakness of the Korean nation. 
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Following the annexation, Rhee went into exile to the US, where he 
tirelessly worked for the cause of Korean independence. He sympa- 
thized with the plight of his supporters who stayed behind in Korea, 
counselling caution in opposing Japanese rule. He was no believer in 
armed resistance, but rather supported a gradualist course of cultural 
and educational edification in preparation of future independence. 
Rhee recognized chances for Korean independence once Japan got 
entangled in its war craze and started confronting the big powers. He 
trusted the big powers would eventually grant Korea its independence. 
Small wonder he did not blame moderate nationalists for succumbing 
to Japanese pressure, for losing hope, and for ending up collaborating. 
The 'qualified' nationalism that he shared inevitably led his followers 
into collaboration. After liberation, he stood by his erstwhile allies and 
returned them to positions of social and political dominance. The Korean 
colonial elite formed the core of South Korea's social elite. Despite the 
loudly proclaimed nationalism of the likes of Syngman Rhee and his 
successors as president, the South Korean elite was intellectually heir 
to the conviction that Korea was a weak state, and that the autonomous 
survival of the Korean nation was under permanent threat. They shared 
the political culture of 19th-century sadaejutii-the doctrine of 'serving the 
Great1-which made Korean rulers buy big power protection in return 
for political sub~ervience.~ 
Following the Korean War, the main threat to South Korea was still 
emanating from the North. The Democratic People's Republic of Ko- 
rea had lost no time in rebuilding its war-ravaged infrastructure with 
the help of its allies. Unlike the situation in the South, where a lot of 
American aid was diverted into slush funds used for buying political 
support, the North's centrally planned economic structure proved most 
effective in kick-starting the economy. The atmosphere in the South was 
depressed, without much hope. Given the North's proud historical roots 
in the armed resistance against Japanese imperialism, such reticence 
was utterly absent. Instead, a strong sense of historical legitimacy and 
an ideology of pride in what can be achieved single-handedly- the 
essence of North Korea's juch'e ideology-gave rise to an unflinching 
self-confidence. 
South Korea's post-Korean War history is fundamentally shaped 
by the looming presence of North Korea. The willingness of the US to 
pump endless amounts of aid money into the South Korean economy is 
contextualized by South Korea's unique position as a capitalist outpost 
on the edge of the 'free ~ o r l d ' . ~  Behind the facade of such ideological 
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sloganeering hid a quite different reality. Democracy was a farce in 
South Korea, always conveniently qualified and curtailed by referring 
to the threat North Korea posed. 
Following Syngman Rhee's abdication in 1960, a 13-month democratic 
interlude was cut short by a coup d'etat staged by Park Chung Hee. 
Park is a clear example of the despots that ruled South Korea for nearly 
half a century. A nationalist zealot, he defended his coup by pointing 
out that the social turmoil that had gripped the country in the wake 
of Rhee's overthrow might have provoked an attack by North Korea. 
He also blamed corruption among politicians for the dismal state of 
the economy and promised that his rule would lift South Korea out of 
its endemic poverty into the ranks of 'civilized nations'. Like Rhee, he 
was nationalist with a colonial past - service in the Japanese imperial 
army, training at a Japanese military academy in Manchukuo-and he 
shared the pre-democratic nationalist tradition of 19th-century Korean 
intellectuals. 
An enlightened nationalist, Park force-fed modernization on an unen- 
lightened, lethargic nation. His goal was mobilization of the people for 
economic development, not just to win the competition with the North, 
but also to raise the standing of Korea in the world. Park loathed South 
Korea's dependency on international developmental aid, he wanted to 
raise the international reputation of the country. In order to do so, he 
mobilized the population in a program of state-controlled economic de- 
velopment. The message was made palatable by appealing to nationalist 
sentiments. He was obsessed by the idea that Korea was backward. The 
nation he had in mind was 'modern', where cultural superstition was 
replaced by rational thought, where efficiency replaced lethargy, and 
where steel mills and shipbuilding wharfs were the nation's pride. As 
a true nation builder, he was shaping a national identity, lambasting 
the people for their backwardness, holding out the prospect of a first- 
rate nation, heralding the goal of self-reliance in an economic fortress 
besieged by predator nations.1° Total mobilization and unquestioning 
obedience were the hallmarks of his regime, justified by raising the 
spectre of a northern threat and foreign domination. Rather than the 
self-confident, open nationalism that South Korea exudes today, the 
country was gripped by a fearful, closed nationalism. Park turned Korea 
into a fortress, a garrison state, where total control was imposed (Kim, 
Jai-Hyup 1978). The well-developed and ruthless security apparatus 
prevented dissenting voices from being heard; nevertheless, resistance 
continued to smoulder. 
Koen De Ceuster 
Following the murder of Park Chung Hee, six months of relative 
freedom ensued. A care-taker president relaxed the stringent controls on 
society, and the demands for democratic reform resurfaced. Once again, 
a military intervention prevented democracy from blossoming. Chun 
Doo Hwan's phased coup d'etat culminating in the bloody suppression 
of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising pushed the genie back into the bottle.ll It 
would take another seven years for the opposition to muster enough sup- 
port to be able to topple the authoritarian state. The memory of Kwangju 
lingered on, and prevented Chun from establishing true popular cred- 
ibility. The shock of Kwangju was also the catalyst that strengthened the 
resolve of the anti-authoritarian opposition movement and allowed it to 
formulate an ideological critique of the authoritarian state. This led to 
the development during the 1980s of a counter-culture movement that 
undermined the legitimacy of the South Korean regime. 
In the midst of such political stagnation, the South's economy powered 
ahead. The contrast with the North could not be starker. Stubbornly 
clinging to its juch'e ideology, the DPRK economy ground to a disastrous 
halt. By the time the ROK was granted membership to the OECD in 
1996, the North was on an international aid lifeline. It had been deserted 
by its former friends and allies, its industrial base was obsolete, the 
agricultural sector was haemorrhaging, and to top it all, amid natural 
disasters and a gruesome famine, the Great Leader passed away in July 
1994. With the economic gap between the two Koreas widening by the 
year, the threat perception from the North was sharply reduced. The 
South's economic development also allowed Seoul to upgrade its mili- 
tary capabilities, thereby reducing its dependence on the US military's 
technological might. 
Seoul to the World 
The economy may have provided the right conditions, but radical 
changes in the political landscape in South Korea were the trigger to a 
reshaping of its foreign policies. Authoritarian regimes had forced the 
country into rapid economic development, but a resilient society grew 
exasperated with authoritarianism and demanded democratic reforms. 
In the summer of 1987 the authoritarian state gave in to mounting 
public pressure by acceding to direct, free and democratic presidential 
elections. In retrospect, this largely cosmetic concession proved to be 
the start of a decade of an ever-deepening democratization of society 
(Saxer 2002). Through successive parliamentary and presidential elec- 
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tions, the entrenched elites were gradually pushed aside, the state was 
reappropriated and made more accountable (Shin 2004). 
The lingering legacy of backroom dealings, corruption and political 
bickering may not have increased popular trust in politicians in general, 
but support for the democratic institutions is considerable. This was 
quite apparent when the opposition-dominated National Assembly tried 
to unseat President Roh Moo Hyun by impeaching him on very slim 
charges in March 2004. Dubbed a 'parliamentary coup d'etat', citizens 
took to the streets in defence of their president and the democracy they 
had fought for in 1987, against the vengefulness of old-style politicians. 
Sensing that the achievements of the democratization struggle were 
challenged, the parliamentary elections of 15 April, in the midst of the 
impeachment imbroglio, saw a remarkable voter turnout, following 
years of declining participation rates in presidential and particularly 
parliamentary elections. The party supporting the president won a 
landslide victory, securing Roh Moo Hyun a majority in the National 
Assembly and allowing him to pursue his reform policies. 
That citizens were mobilized in support of their embattled president is 
testimony to the vibrant civil society that has developed in the wake of 
political democratization.12 If democracy has deepened in South Korea, 
this is certainly a result of the ever-watchful eye of various civil society 
organizations who, in tandem with a much freer press, have made politi- 
cians more accountable for their actions.13 Building on the legacy of the 
anti-authoritarian political struggles of the 1980s, civil society organiza- 
tions have become the hallmark of the maturing of Korean democracy. 
The activists who had toppled the authoritarian state resurfaced in the 
1990s in various civil society movements to ensure that democratization 
meant more than a cosmetic institutional change (Kim, Hy6n-Mi 2003). 
Covering the entire gamut of subjects from consumer interests (includ- 
ing environmental issues), to social and economic justice, human rights 
and political transparency, civil society groups critically followed the 
working of South Korea's democratic institutions (Kim, Hyuk-Rae 2004: 
422-5). Cases of corruption and backroom dealings made a mistrustful 
public highly critical of the functioning of the political institutions and 
their personnel. It is a lasting legacy of civil society movements that they 
pushed the democratization of Korean society beyond the country's 
political institutions. NGOs saw their role in society recognized during 
the presidencies of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, who formally 
integrated the civil society organizations in the institutional framework 
of South Korea's 'participatory democracy'. This in turn was part of 
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the political project of both these presidents to sever and replace the 
old state-business nexus and increase the transparency of the political 
decision-making process (Ahn and Lee 2003).14 
This development coincides with and is a result of a generational 
shift in Korea, both among politicians and the electorate. The so-called 
386-generation-Koreans in their (late) thirties, born in the 1960s, and 
fighting for democracy on university campuses during the 1980s-are 
the ones who represent the majority vote in Korea today.15 They are 
also a coveted human resources pool tapped by the administrations 
of both Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. Their obsession had never 
been the Korean War or the North Korean communist threat, nor pov- 
erty or destitution, but the illegitimate and politically inept regime of 
Chun Doo Hwan and his alleged American sponsors. More than just 
a political struggle, they had fought a social struggle for democracy, a 
fight against government-business collusion which had not only engen- 
dered a tradition of corruption, but which had also distorted economic 
development in favour of the large conglomerates (chaebo'l). These they 
viewed as bulwarks of nepotism that stifled free initiative. Just as they 
distrusted politicians, so too did the 386-generation doubt the chaebo'l. 
Both were seen as a self-serving elite who pretended to speak and work 
for the nation, but ultimately only had their own interests at heart. Civil 
society organizations both held politicians accountable for their actions, 
and were highly critical of chaebo'l dominance of the Korean economy. 
The 1997 financial crisis was the watershed that finally disqualified the 
old generation. While the chaebo'l hung in the ropes, knocked out by 
the blow of the 1997 crisis, the 386-generation saw an opportunity for 
venture projects in IT and other businesses. Politically, Kim Dae Jung 
opened up the channels of power to them. Roh Moo Hyun's presidency 
is even more outspoken in that regard. (Kim, Pang-H~i 2003; Kim, By- 
ung-Kook 2003: 236-8). 
The empowerment of the people and the accountability of South Ko- 
rea's political personnel have, in turn, led to a remarkable redefinition of 
South Korea's international p~sition.~~Following decades of submissive- 
ness, a towering pride has taken control of Koreans. They feel proud of 
their peaceful democratization and secure in their economic success, both 
of which they realized single-handedly. Gone are the days when Koreans 
felt small and powerless. Gone are the days when the Korean govern- 
ment could cow the people into frightened submission. The struggle for 
(economic) survival in an unforgiving world has been won. Between the 
1988 Seoul Olympics and the 2002 Soccer World Championship, Korea 
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underwent a facelift from pubescent insecurity to mature adulthood. In 
the course of 15 years, a new generation, unburdened by the past but 
shouldering the historical mission of bringing North and South Korea 
together again, gradually invaded and undermined the old establish- 
ment. Back in 1988, Korea showcased itself to the world as a successful 
Asian NIC, a model of state-led rapid industrialization. By 2002, Korea 
had grown into one of the largest trading nations in the world, embrac- 
ing globalization as an opportunity rather than a threat. The success of 
the 1988 Olympics had been realized under a stern authoritarian state 
that had workers in constant tow and held political freedom at bay. By 
2002, Korea was a beacon of peaceful democratization in Asia, a nation 
at ease with itself, proud of its success and confident in its future. 
In contrast to the Seoul Olympics, when the state led the people in 
a sports celebration for the world, the 2002 World Cup was carried by 
grassroots support. The spontaneous outburst of support for the national 
team during late-night rallies in front of City Hall in Seoul and across 
other cities in the country was an expression of this new confidence and 
proud self-image. Most remarkable of all was the composed, peaceful 
nature of the gatherings, and the absence of any animosity towards the 
nation's opponents (on and off the field). The positive self-image and 
radiating pride that imbues Koreans today, allows them to step out 
towards the world, magnanimously.17 Both the government, through 
development aid and co-operation, and the civil society, through in- 
ternational networking, have moved beyond the confines of Korea's 
borders to reach out to the region and the world.18 
Economic success has allowed Korea to speak internationally with its 
own voice. The presidency of K m  Dae Jung-dubbed the 'Nelson Mandela 
of Asia' because he seemed the personification of opposition against the 
authoritarian regimes-proved a turning point in Korea's international 
positioning. Coming to politics from a different background than previous 
presidents, and building his power on a different political constituency, 
Kim Dae Jung marked the clearest break ever with Korea's post-liberation 
tradition.19 Confident in the strength of Korean democracy and proud of its 
economic success, he turned to the future rather than being bogged down 
by the past.20 Kim Dae Jung took a bold initiative to once and for all lay the 
colonial past to rest and to build a strong future-oriented relationship with 
Japan as a close neighbour and important trading partner. At the same 
time, he moved to open Korea's market for Japanese (cultural) products, 
much to the dismay of recalcitrant anti-Japanese diehards. Kim Dae Jung's 
message, however, was clear. The government would no longer play off 
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the anti-Japanese trump card whenever it served domestic mobilization. 
The president's innovative and forward-looking diplomacy contributed 
to a formidable change in South Korean relations with Japan, laying the 
lingering prejudice and grudges over Japan's political inability to atone 
for its colonial wrongdoings to re~t .~lThe success of the joint organization 
of the 2002 Soccer World Championships can be seen as a symbol of this 
new relationship. 
Symbolism aside, anti-Japanese friction reappears from time to time. 
The Seoul government continues to express regret whenever Japanese 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visits the Yasukuni Shrine, but this 
is no longer allowed to become a stumbling block in their bilateral rela- 
tions. Although the state may have compartmentalized relations with 
Japan so as to prevent outstanding historical friction from impeding the 
development of its relations with Japan, some segments in society still 
raise a tantrum whenever they deem that the national honour, territorial 
integrity, or historical legacy of Korea is being tarnished.22 
Kim Dae Jung's overtures towards Japan were motivated by two 
concerns. As a responsible participant in a globalized world economy, 
unjustifiable impediments to free trade had become unacceptable. On a 
diplomatic level, South Korea needed Japanese support and co-operation 
in its audacious overtures towards North Korea. Kim Dae Jung had bro- 
ken the diplomatic deadlock with North Korea and was moving doggedly 
beyond the imposed confines of traditional South Korean diplomacy in 
an attempt to open a new era of inter-Korean relations. Convinced of 
the sterility of the traditional confrontational strategy towards North 
Korea, he opted for a policy of co-operation and engagement, dubbed 
the 'Sunshine Policy'. The most palpable success of this approach was 
the summit meeting he arranged in Pyongyang with the North Korean 
leader Kim Jong I1 in June 2000. Ever since, relations with the North have 
been expanding and interaction with Pyongyang increasing. 
In pursuing his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae Jung was building on the 
groundwork that had been laid by Roh Tae Woo's 'Nordpolitik'. What 
was however fundamentally different was the acknowledgement that 
the South did not seek the collapse or overthrow of the Northern regime. 
He explicitly stated that the aim of his policies was not the absorption 
of the North, but a gradual process of co-operation and reconciliation. 
He also uncoupled political progress from cultural, academic, people- 
to-people and economic exchanges. It took Pyongyang nearly two years 
and some (financial) inducement to cast off its suspicion and finally 
accept his offer.23 
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Particularly interesting in respect to South Korea's changed interna- 
tional positioning was the fact that Kim Dae Jung had proactively sought 
support for his policies among South Korea's allies. Never before had a 
South Korean government so prominently taken the lead in engaging 
the North. More than ever, Seoul now decides on how to conduct inter- 
Korean relations on its own terms, and with its own interests (rather 
than the interests of its defence ally, the US) in mind. Whereas Kim Dae 
Jung publicly confirmed the continuity of the ROK-US security alliance, 
Roh Moo Hyun declared his adherence to the alliance, while seeking 
a more reciprocal and equitable relationship with the US.2' Although 
Washington finds it difficult to adapt to this changed Korean attitude, 
particularly at a time when unilateralism rules its foreign policy, it is 
equally clear that South Korean diplomacy is leaning heavily on the 
Bush administration to soften its hard-line approach towards North 
K~rea.~jSeoul does so in tandem with its regional partners. 
Convinced that Seoul's allies had to speak with one voice, Kim Dae 
Jung promoted the co-ordination of the North Korea policies of the US, 
Japan and South Korea through the creation of the Trilateral Oversight 
and Coordination Group in 1999. Such co-ordination serves multiple 
purposes. Lack of policy co-ordination had in the past led to needless 
friction among the allies. Suspicions flared in particular when either 
Japan or the US entered into direct dialogue with Pyongyang without 
prior consultation with Seoul. Comprehensive trilateral co-ordination 
was also an improvement on the traditional bilateral security dialogue 
that the US separately maintained with Japan and South Korea respec- 
tively. The clarity reached in such a trilateral forum also cleared the 
dialogue channel with Pyongyang. North Korea could no longer play 
off one ally against another, nor could there be any misunderstanding 
of what the allies had to offer to the North, both in terms of carrots 
and/or sticks. 
Kim Dae Jung paid attention to more than Seoul's traditional security 
alliances which dated back to the Cold War era. In the rapidly chang- 
ing security environment following the end of the Cold War, and in the 
context of China's increasing economy boom, Seoul sought to position 
itself as an active player in the region through expanding both its bilat- 
eral and multilateral contacts. In particular, Sino-Korean relations have 
never been so close. In a remarkable twist of history, the two former 
foes have turned, in little more than a decade since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, into de facto allies. On the one hand, there is a clear 
economic imperative. China is currently Seoul's main trading partner, 
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and the prime receiver of Korean FDI. On the other hand, there are also 
obvious diplomatic reasons behind these improved relations. As Seoul 
is developing a more proactive diplomacy anchored firmly in regional 
co-operation, it is obliged to seek Peking's CO-operation.26 
Seoul's diplomacy is not only driven by a strong dose of pragmatism, 
but also by the fundamental desire to accomplish-or at least further-the 
historical task of reunification of the Korean nation. Following the suc- 
cessful democratization of the South, the process of national rehabili- 
tation will not be accomplished until the reunification of the nation is 
achieved. After wresting the state from the hands of a tainted elite, the 
nation now has the task of reuniting the two divided halves of the pen- 
insula. The division was the consequence of foreign intervention, the 
unification will be the doing of Koreans. Politicians are well aware that 
a chasm looms between such fine ideals and the difficulties of bringing 
the two widely divergent political systems of North and South Korea 
closer to each other. Nonetheless, since the presidency of Kim Dae Jung, 
the South Korean government has persevered in its single-minded ef- 
forts to improve relations with the North. Not even the second nuclear 
crisis surrounding North Korea, which has been unfolding since October 
2002, is capable of derailing inter-Korean relations. Seoul stubbornly 
sticks to its own agenda, acknowledging along the way that the nuclear 
crisis needs to be solved peacefully. In pursuing this course, it finds a 
surprisingly willing partner in the North, as both states discover ever 
more common ground in their awkward mating game. Contrary to what 
many observers suggest, the North is not just motivated by the material 
benefits it gains from increased trade and investment, there is also a real 
and deep sense of the historical imperative for reunification. 
Looking at the ongoing nuclear stand-off between North Korea and 
the US (and by extension the rest of the world), it is small wonder that 
a chasm was opening up between Washington and Seoul. While Seoul, 
along with Peking, wanted to see a peaceful and negotiated settlement, 
the Bush administration maintained an intransigent and to Pyongyang 
largely unacceptable position: the complete, verifiable and irreversible 
dismantlement (CVID) of all its nuclear programmes before the US 
was willing to enter in any real  negotiation^.^' Pressure from the other 
parties in the six nation negotiations certainly contributed to the fact 
that Washington eventually seemed to soften its stance. It was quite 
remarkable to see the South Korean delegation table a roadmap dur- 
ing the second round of talks in February 2004, which held out CVID 
at the end of the negotiating process, but would start with a verified 
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freezing of all existing nuclear programmes (basically the status quo 
ante October 2002). It is towards this position that Washington moved 
during the third round of talks in June 2004, when the US proposed a 
verifiable commitment by the North to fully declare its programmes, to 
verifiably halt its nuclear activities, to disable its nuclear weapons, and 
to make preparations for the elimination of its nuclear fa~i l i t ies .~~ 
Seoul counterbalances this ongoing American reluctance to engage 
Pyongyang by engaging its partners in the region in its efforts to induce 
the North out of its isolation. Despite the regularly repeated avowal of 
its security pledge, lingering doubts about Washington's commitment 
to the defence of South Korea are providing a further impetus to the 
nation's leaders to pay particular attention to the regional balance of 
power.29 Fear of American disengagement following the end of the Cold 
War made Seoul's strategists look towards regional multilateral security 
co-operation. Awakening to the need for a regional power equilibrium, 
Seoul now considers the solution of the Korea question within a regional 
context of checks and balances. The first concrete step in the direction of 
a regional security forum was the establishment of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in 1994. Kim Dae Jung for his part promoted co-ordination 
between Japan, China and South Korea in the ASEAN Plus Three frame- 
work, and he proposed the establishment of a Northeast Asian security 
co-operation regime (Moon and Kim 2004: 263-4; Yi 2005). Maybe the 
most promising forum to date is the stalled Six Party Talks. The North 
Korean nuclear stalemate has brought all the strategic players in the 
region together. An earnest effort is underway to find a peaceful solu- 
tion to this specific problem, but it might set a precedent and become a 
more permanent forum, not unlike the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Though initially intended as an ad hoc 
response to a crisis that was dangerously spiralling out of control, this 
forum now has the possible bearings of a future institutionalized security 
co-operation and co-ordination platform, with the potential to outlast 
the present North Korean crisis (Yun 2005: 51-2). 
Conclusion 
South Korea's first and foremost foreign policy concern remains North 
Korea. Over the last two decades, the threat assessment of North Korea 
has shifted from a military towards a more comprehensive security 
concern. With a new generation of politicians in command, and after 
five years of 'sunshine' engagement on various fronts, ideological con- 
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frontation has become secondary to the acknowledgement of national 
unity. The realization that relations with the North cannot improve in 
isolation, but inevitably must take place in a regional context, has caused 
Seoul to adopt a much more outspoken regional profile, commensurate 
with its economic and political standing. 
At a time when an intransigent US administration is hampering 
Seoul's endeavour towards improved relations with the North, cracks 
are appearing in the traditional security alliance. Although Seoul has 
made it clear that it still values this security alliance and considers it 
crucial to the geopolitical equilibrium, it is equally firm about a much 
needed redefinition of the specific role each partner plays in the alliance. 
If cracks appear, then probably this is because the sitting administra- 
tion in Washington is not sensitive enough to the feelings that reign in 
South Korea. Seoul is committed to contribute to the easing of tensions 
in the region. It does so in both bilateral and multilateral contacts with 
its partners in the region. Realizing that even a united Korea still moves 
in the shadow of its larger neighbours, it is working for a multilateral 
security regime where a comprehensive approach to security issues in 
mutual recognition and respect of national interests can be addressed. 
The free direct presidential elections of December 1987 opened up a 
new era in the history of Korea. Since then, Koreans have again learned 
to speak with their own voice. Both the people and the leaders they 
elect defend their rightful national interests. More than just institutional 
democracy, they have regained an agency that they had long forgotten. 
Rather than stand by and watch developments unfold around it, Seoul 
has awoken to the challenge of shaping its own future, a future for the 
Korean peninsula. Seoul is determined to prove that even a shrimp, if 
moving shrewdly, can move among whales. 
Koen De Ceuster is Associate Professor at the Centre for Korean Studies, 
Leiden University.  
NOTES 
The Taewbn'gun, father of the infant King Kojong (r.1864-1907) and for nearly a 
decade the de facto regent of Korea, was the first to face up to the crises confront- 
ing the country. Domestically, central state power was severely curtailed through 
bureaucratic incompetence and in-fighting, through corruption and peasant unrest, 
and through a dwindling revenue base. His attempts at reinvigorating the state 
through a comprehensive dynastic restoration clashed with institutional opposi- 
tion. When in 1873 Kojong reached adulthood, the Taewbn'gun was removed from 
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power, and the rigidly isolationist foreign policy was gradually abandoned (Palais 
1991). 
The Korean War has received its fair share of scholarly attention. Brune (1996) 
presents a good overview of the available literature. Whereas Cumings (1981 & 
1990) stresses the domestic roots of the conflict, William Stueck (1995,2002) focuses 
more on the international ramifications of the Korean War. 
A very good example of this style of work is the latest spate of publications on 
the North Korean nuclear threat and how the US should deal with it. The focus of 
these is almost exclusively on what US strategies should be, as if the South Korean 
government should have no voice in the debate over North Korea, let alone the 
acknowledgement of any Chinese agency in the issue. See, for example, Cha and 
Kang (2003) and O'Hanlon and Mochizuki (2003). 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, international affairs were a simple thing for South 
Korean politicians. Surrounded by more or less inimical states, the bilateral rela- 
tions with the US were of paramount importance. Cha (1999) gives an interesting 
analysis of how distorting and ultimately detrimental to Korea's own interests such 
an attitude was. 
A telling example of this changed attitude can be found in the frankness with which 
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun recently criticized the North Korea policy of 
the Bush administration. To make sure that his message was heard loud and clear, 
he used the opportunity of a speaking engagement before the World Affairs Coun- 
cil in Los Angeles on 12 November 2004 to vent his conviction that North Korea's 
security fears were legitimate and had to be addressed. Not only did he say this on 
American soil, but also prior to a scheduled meeting with US President George W. 
Bush during the APEC meeting in Santiago de Chile some days later. (Roh Moo 
Hyun's speeches can be found on www.korea.net). 
I wish to acknowledge the theoretical clarifications Michael Mau-Kuei Chang brought 
to our discussions in the course of the preparation of the IIAS workshop on 'Emerg- 
ing National Self-Assertion in East Asia' (Amsterdam, 25 May 2004). 
Jager (2003) offers an insight on how divergent perceptions of Korea's history lead 
to different attitudes to Korea's place in the world. 
Syngman Rhee's position in Korean history has come under scrutiny recently. For a 
long time, he stood aloof of any criticism as Father of the Fatherland. Democratization 
spurred a historical revisionist movement that tried to understand the authoritarian 
past. As part of this revisionist reflex, Syngman Rhee's unwavering nationalism is 
now very much contested. One good example of this reappraisal of Syngman Rhee 
is Chdng (2001). On historical revisionism, see De Ceuster (2001). 
In 1961, the US still contributed more than 90 percent of South Korea's national 
budget! (Kim, Byung-Kook 2003: 237). For a comprehensive treatment of the US-ROK 
economic ties in the pre-Park Chung Hee era, see Woo (1991: 45-60). 
Park Chung Hee was moved by a near-Messianic zeal. He spared no effort to con- 
vince and mobilize the population, but also preach his revolution abroad. For a good 
example of this, see Park (1971). 
Following the murder of Park Chung Hee on 26 October 1979, formal political power 
was taken over by the then Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha. Chun Doo Hwan remained in 
the wings, first securing total control over the military, and in the course of the spring 
of 1980, wresting control over the political institutions by having a revised constitution 
accepted in a referendum. On 17 May, amid growing popular unrest, he imposed a 
nationwide martial law regime, suspended all political institutions, and had political 
and student leaders arrested. Citizens of Kwangju protested against the imposition 
of martial law in general and the arrest of their political hero, Kim Dae Jung. Chun 
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responded to this public defiance by sending in Special Forces who went on a three- 
day rampage through this provincial capital. Rather than quelling the protests, this 
intervention led the people to storm weapons depots and drive the Special Forces out 
of the city. After a stand-off of nearly a week, regular army troops entered the city and 
ended the insurrection. The official-mortality count stands now at nearly 250, a figure 
that remains contested. This episode forever tarnished the legitimacy of Chun Doo 
Hwan. The legacy of Kwangju became a rallying cry for all opposition forces against 
the authoritarian state (Oh 1999: 73-86; Shin and Hwang 2003). 
l2 NO less than 551 citizen groups joined an appeal to stage rallies against the impeach- 
ment procedure following the parliamentary vote that suspended the president from 
duty (Na, Jeong-ju 2004). 
l3 The April 2000 National Assembly elections offer a good illustration of the specific 
role that civil society plays in South Korean society today. Despite the fact that 
the state has a National Election Commission to oversee campaign and elections 
procedures, there were doubts about its independence and effectiveness. A total 
bf 412 citizen groups united into a Citizens' ~ i l i ance  to oversee and double-check 
the fairness of the election campaign. They blacklisted 86 candidates who they 
claimed were unsuited for the job given their past (parliamentary) record. Given 
that 59 blacklisted candidates did not make it into the 16th National Assembly, 
their campaign can be considered a success (Shin, Myung-Soon 2004: 14-20). There 
is a downside to the proliferation of NGOs. South Korean civil society movements 
tend to be issue-driven, reacting to immediate causes. Institutional weakness is an 
inevitable consequence of such volatility (Kim, Hyuk-Rae 2004: 420). 
l%yuk-~ae Kim (2004: 421) sees a development away from 'conventional state-centric 
governance' paradigm towards a social governance paradigm where, in response to 
the authoritarian legacy of Korean politics, civil society is granted an institutional- 
ized role thereby breaking the monopoly of parties and politicians over legislation 
and its enforcement. 
l' Coined by the press, the 386-generation is now a common concept used in such di- 
verse fields as political analysis, marketing and popular culture. Google Korea comes 
up with more than 67,000 hits when searching for 386sedae. (www.google.co.kr, ac- 
cessed on 14 March 2005). This 386-generation compares with the 5060-generation, 
people in their fifties/sixties, but also meaning, when read in Korean, those people 
identified with the Fifth (Chun Doo Hwan) and Sixth (Roh Tae Woo) Republic. In 
his analysis of the 2002 Presidential Election, Car1 Saxer (2003) questions the often 
proclaimed 'generational earthquake', stressing instead the continued importance 
of regional voting patterns. By focusing on regionalism as an enduring factor in the 
2002 elections, Saxer seems to under-estimate the developments that are appearing 
on the horizon. Regionalism should be qualified. Roh Moo Hyun's success in the 
Cholla region, which was the power base of the Millennium Democratic Party of 
outgoing President Kim Dae Jung, provides already a political lining to the regional 
voting pattern. Roh Moo Hyun has his roots in the rival city of Pusan, home ground 
of former President KimYoung Sam. Roh Moo Hyun, in fact, sought the MDP nomi- 
nation in order to break the spell of regionalism in Korean politics (Kim, Hybn-mi 
2003: 212). The regionalist voting pattern is seen here as diluted and overlapping 
with a clear 'opposition' or even 'anti-establishment' vote. Such 'anti-establishment' 
L A 
feelings have a long and well-founded tradition in Korean history, and should be 
taken for what they are: political attitudes. Furthermore, the demographic shift in 
Korean society is inevitably leading to changing voting patterns. Already during 
the 2002 presidential election, 48 percent of the electorate belonged to the 20-30 age 
bracket. While their participation in elections may not have been overwhelming 
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(hovering around 50 percent), this generation votes more out of political motivations 
and convictions than any previous generation. Given the different political/histori- 
cal context in which they grew up, they vote differently. As a recent poll indicated, 
they are at ease with a globalizing economy, they support the engagement policies 
towards North Korea, and have a critical attitude towards the international role of 
the US (Na, Sbn-mi 2005; see also Kim, Byung-Kook 2003). 
l6   ore than any other age group, this 386-generation is marked by a strong sense 
of anti-Americanism, the result of a common perception that the US government 
condoned the suppression of the Kwangju Uprising (Kim, Byung-Kook 2003: 236-8). 
Chun Doo Hwan misled the Kwangju people into believing that US government 
had agreed to the dispatch of Special Forces to Kwangju. Despite a formal protest 
at the time by the US ambassador, this story was never retracted. Ever since the 
Kwangju Uprising, the US government has been less than forthcoming in clarifying 
its role at that critical time in Korean history. This attitude indirectly strengthened 
the perception popular among students and dissidents that the US had always been 
on the side of the oppressor (Oberdorfer 1997: 128-30). 
Democratization and liberalization of the Korean economy went hand in hand. The 
traditionally closed economy was gradually opening up. Not only US pressure to 
open the domestic market, but also the desire to play a more responsible role in inter- 
national trade agreements made the Korean government open to the world economy. 
Import barriers were gradually lifted, and Korean companies began investing in 
distribution and production facilities abroad. In the 1990s, South Korea also began 
to play a more prominent role in international politics, both globally and regionally. 
Furthermore, in 1988, free foreign travel was made possible by the relaxation of the 
rules to acquire passports. Korean citizens began spending part of their wealth on 
discovering the world. Finally, the press also played an important role in bringing 
the world to Seoul. With press restrictions lifted, international reporting in Korean 
media increased and improved in quality. 
l8 South Korea developed from an aid recipient in the 1950s to 1960s into an interna- 
tional aid donor in the 1990s. President Roh Tae Woo launched the Korean Overseas 
Volunteers (KOV) programme in 1989 and established the Korean International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in 1991 to co-ordinate under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Korea's overseas development aid (see http://www. 
koica.go.kr/). Having been on the receiving end of international aid, Seoul is mo- 
tivated by a strong sense of moral obligation to repay an international community 
that made the survival of South Korea possible during and after the Korean War. 
Hence Seoul's eagerness to contribute to international aid programmes and to play 
a responsible role in the UN. 
l9 The gradual process of democratization can be discerned by looking at the bio- 
graphies of the successive presidents since 1988. Roh Tae Woo (1988-92) was Chun 
Doo Hwan's hand-picked candidate for president. Not only did he have a military 
background, but he had stood by Chun Doo Hwan in his ascension to power in 1980. 
Kim Young Sam (1992-98) may have had a long parliamentary career of opposition 
to the authoritarian state, but he was part of the political establishment working 
within the boundaries set by the state. In 1990, he brokered an alliance with the 
government Democratic Justice Party, heir to the authoritarian state, in an attempt 
to strengthen his presidential bid in the 1991 elections. Although this move allowed 
him to reform the system from within, it is equally true that his alliance with the old 
elite curtailed his ability to reform the state apparatus and remove the entrenched 
elites. Kim Dae Jung was the first opposition candidate to win a presidential elec- 
tion. Despite his strategic alliance in the run-up to the election with Kim Jong Pil, 
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the former right-hand man of Park Chung Hee and founder of the infamous KCIA, 
his was the clearest break to date with the authoritarian past. More than anything 
else, his political power base was utterly different from the previous governments. 
The financial crisis of 1997 which seemed to confirm the bankruptcy of the old boys' 
network of state-business collusion, allowed the incoming president to act swiftly 
(Gills and Gills 1999). Roh Moo Hyun's election in 2001 was another step in the 
deepening of democratization in Korea. With his 'new kid on the block' populist 
image, he rides a wave of popular support which sustains him in power over and 
against the distrust and disgust of the establishment. 
20 In domestic politics he did so by not only granting a presidential pardon but even 
inviting two former presidents and past foes, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, 
to his inauguration on 25 February 1998. During Kirn Young Sam's presidency, both 
Chun and Roh had faced various charges (including embezzlement and graft), and 
were convicted to respectively life in prison and 17 years on charges of an illegal 
army mutiny (the 12 December 1979 coup d'etat that opened Chun Doo Hwan's 
route to power) and the bloody suppression of the Kwangju Uprising. 
21 During his landmark visit to Japan in August 1998, President Kirn Dae Jung came 
away with a remarkably upfront apology from the Japanese government. During 
his presidency, the import ban on Japanese cars and cultural products was lifted, 
and bilateral contacts were increased and diversified, including even joint military 
rescue operations at sea. While the South Korean government moves away from the 
past, the future holds new challenges. Pressure is growing in Japan to amend the 
peace constitution. Already, the role of the Self Defence Forces has been increased 
in order to respond swiftly to the new threats of the post-9/11 world order where 
non-state entities seem to pose graver dangers than states (Yun 2005: 21). 
22 A number of outstanding issues (Japanese history schoolbooks, Tokdo/Takeshima, 
compensation for 'comfort women') cloud from time to time South Korean-Japanese 
relations. The South Korean government's attitude is by and large reactive, both 
to provocations from certain quarters in Japan, and to pressure from civil society 
groups in Korea itself. March 2005 saw a sudden flare-up of the Tokdo/Takeshima 
territorial dispute, leading to considerable diplomatic friction. In April 2005, gov- 
ernmental and popular dismay over the approval of revisionist history textbooks 
further clouded bilateral relations. Since raw emotions dominate at this stage, neither 
government can afford to concede. Once the dust settles and the air is clear again, 
the focus will shift towards the long-term policy goals of good neighbourly rela- 
tions and multilateral security arrangements. Only such arrangements can contain 
the possible threat posed by a Japan that is moving towards amending its peace 
constitution and redefining the role of its Self Defence Forces (Pak 2005). 
23 Kim Dae Jung announced his 'Sunshine Policy' during his inaugural speech in 
February 1998. Pyongyang was hesitant, but eventually got its act together. As we 
know now, the June 2000 summit meeting between Kirn Dae Jung and Kirn Jong 
I1 was made more palatable to the North through a major (illegal) donation of 
US$500 million. A major breakthrough in North-South relations came during the 
last weeks of Roh Tae Woo's presidency, when on 13 December 1991 both Koreas 
adopted an 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Co- 
operation between the South and the North', followed later that same month by a 
North-south denuclearization agreement. Kirn Young Sam was much more scepti- 
cal about relations with the North. Following Kirn I1 Sung's death in July 1994, his 
refusal to send condolences to the North Korean people made Pyongyang slam the 
door on any further governmental contact with Seoul during his presidency. Since 
the North was gripped by a severe food and economical crisis, Kirn Young Sam 
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did not mind because he was convinced that it was only a matter of time before 
the North Korean regime would collapse. On the 1991 agreements and Kirn Young 
Sam's attitude towards the North, see Oberdorfer (1997: 260-408) and Sigal (1998). 
A most unflattering portrait of Kirn Young Sam is found in Wit et al. (2004). One 
of the reasons why Pyongyang hesitated to respond to Kirn Dae Jung's offer was 
initial distrust. Even in the best of circumstances, negotiations with the North are 
a difficult balancing act. Following Kirn Young Sam's presidency, with Pyongyang 
rattled by the death of Kirn I1 Sung, famine and economic crisis, Kirn Jong I1 may 
have doubted the true intentions of Kirn Dae Jung. 
2"n his inaugural address on 25 February 2003, Roh Moo Hyun declared: 'This year 
marks the 50th anniversary of the Korea-US Alliance. It has made a significant 
contribution in guaranteeing our security and economic development. The Korean 
people are deeply grateful for this. We will foster and develop this cherished alli- 
ance. We will see to it that the alliance matures into a more reciprocal and equitable 
relationship. We will also expand relations with other countries, including traditional 
friends.' Coming on top of strong anti-American sentiments vented in the run-up to 
the presidential elections in December 2002, some press reports have described this 
demand for a more balanced and equal partnership as a lack of gratitude towards 
the US, going as far as to call for the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. 
25 The drifting apart of South Korea and the US is not just a consequence of the poli- 
cies pursued by the Kirn Dae Jung-Roh Moo Hyun governments. A major break in 
US foreign policy followed the coming to power of George W. Bush. Whereas Kirn 
Dae Jung had found a willing partner in the Clinton administration for his Sunshine 
Policy, he was cold-shouldered by the incoming Bush administration in March 2001. 
Following 9/11, the two alliance partners drifted further apart. Obsessed with terror- 
ism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, the Bush administration 
followed a confrontational policy towards North Korea, whereas the South Korean 
government persevered in its policy of engagement and co-operation. As the two 
governments are drifting apart, so too are the public perceptions in both countries. 
An April 2003 Fox News/Opinion Dynamics opinion poll in the US found that 54 
percent of respondents thought North Korea posed a direct threat to the US, com- 
pared to only 10 percent for Iraq. In contrast, a January 2004 Research & Research 
poll found that 39 percent of South Korean respondents felt the US posed the big- 
gest security threat to Korea (33 percent North Korea, 12 percent China, 8 percent 
Japan). A 1993 Gallup poll had found 44 percent of respondents pointing to North 
Korea, and a mere 1 percent pointing the finger at the US (Yun 2005: 13-14). 
26 ~ e o u l  strategists warn of the risk that overdependence on China may revert the 
geopolitical equilibrium in the region to a 19th-century pattern of dependence. The 
chance that economic dependence on China might in the future curtail the room 
for political manoeuvre of the South Korean government is a real worry. It explains 
why South Korean diplomacy is paying so much attention to multilateral diplomacy, 
and why the chances for an end to the security alliance with the US remain remote 
(Yun 2005; Yi 2005). As Korea rides a wave of national pride and steps up its interna- 
tional profile, some 'irredentist' mavericks in Korea are raising their voices to claim 
the ancient territory of Koguryd (4th to 7th centuries AD) in present Manchuria. 
In response, Chinese historians are involved in attempts to present Koguryd as a 
Chinese state. This attempt to establish the Chineseness of Koguryd can also be seen 
as a move to quell any illusions among the Korean minority in Manchuria about a 
possible incorporation into a future unified Korean state. 
27 This was the attitude taken during the first round of Six Party talks in August 2003. 
From October 2002 until this Peking-mediated diplomatic initiative, Washington 
Koen De Ceuster 
had been basically looking the other way, rather than to seek a direct and negoti- 
ated settlement to the ongoing crisis. The Six Party talks bring Russia, China, Japan, 
North and South Korea and the US to the negotiating table. 
28 Twice North Korea declined to participate in a fourth round. In the run-up to the 
American presidential elections, it came as no surprise that Pyongyang declared it 
was not interested at that stage in participating in the talks. The expected February 
(2005) meeting did not materialize either. Instead, Pyongyang increased the pressure 
on Washington by officially stating that it not only possessed a nuclear weapon, but 
also that it felt no longer bound to adhere to its self-imposed missile test moratorium 
(declared in September 1999). Washington for its part seems to have shifted to a 
more pragmatic position, with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice going as far as 
orally acknowledging North Korean sovereignty. 
29 South Korean governments have often in the past been confronted with American faits 
accomplis. The most recent examples are the unilateral announcement in June 2003 of 
plans for US troop redeployment away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and in 
June 2004 the unilateral announcement of a scheduled reduction by one-third of US 
troops in the South. The timetable of the reduction of US troops was extended so as 
to allow the South Korean armed forces sufficient time to upgrade their weaponry 
to compensate for this reduction in manpower. 
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